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One of the most important but also one of the most controversial areas of interna-
tional law is the legal regulation of the use of military force. The nature, content and 
effectiveness of this domain of international law expresses, much more clearly than 
any other branch, the very nature of international law. One of the most prominent 
20th century international lawyers Louis Henkin wrote, “Almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost 
all of the time.”1 This observation is true and almost all nations almost all of the time 
observe also the principle prohibiting use of force and threat of force in international 
relations. However, use of military force between states belongs to so-called “low 
probability-high consequence events” and therefore every use of military force, even 
if relatively minor, has almost incomparable negative consequences in terms of hu-
man lives lost, properties and livelihoods destroyed and all kinds of miseries in-
creased. Therefore, the enhancement of the observation of this principle remains one 
of the most important tasks of international law and international lawyers.     
In order to grasp the essence of the current debate in this area of international 
law it is helpful to have a brief overview of the evolution of the proscription of the 
use of military force.
1. From the right to war to the prohibition to use force
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates a complete ab-
sence of any legal (or even legal-moral-religious) restriction on the recourse to war 
in Ancient world. As Thucydides writes, “the Athenians and the Peloponnesians be-
gan the war after the thirty-year truce” since “Sparta was forced into it because of her 
apprehensions over the growing power of Athens.”2 This sounds somewhat familiar 
and even contemporary. There had been a change in the balance of power in An-
cient Greece that caused Sparta to ally with smaller Greek city-states – forming the 
Peloponnesian League – to counter militarily the Delian League headed by Athens. 
But differently from today’s or even from yesterday’s world, Greek city-states did 
not need any justi¿ cations to their recourse to arms. Athenians believed it to be “an 
eternal law that the strong can rule the weak” as “justice never kept anyone who was 
handed the chance to get something by force from getting more.”3 Athenian ambas-
sadors explained to the Melians (Melos – a small island city-state) that “those who 
have power use it, while the weak make compromises. Given what we believe about 
1 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 47
2 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, pp. 11–12
3 Ibid.
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the gods and know about men, we think that both are always forced to dominate 
everyone they can. We didn’t lay down this law, it was there—and we weren’t ¿ rst 
to make use of it. Each of us must exercise what power he really thinks he can.”4 
Adam Watson writes that ‘warfare was not considered reprehensible in the an-
cient world. Indeed, the ability to decide when to go to war was the hallmark of 
independence, for a king or city corporation’.5 The words ‘emperor’ and ‘empire’ did 
sound proud indeed. For the Romans any war, if duly declared, would then be ‘just’ 
as well as ‘pious’.6 After Emerich de Vattel, positivism gradually started to prevail 
in international law and the differentiation between just and unjust wars based on 
religious laws or the laws of nature (the human nature or the nature of the state) lost 
its meaning. Although this was not a return to the naked power politics of Ancient 
Greece it was only thinly veiled power politics where any offense, real or perceived, 
may have been good enough to justify the use of military force. Even under the in-
ternational law of ‘civilised nations’ states could legitimately use military force for 
a wide range of purposes. The right to resort to arms was an important attribute of 
state sovereignty. In the nineteenth century the only limitation on the use of force 
by a state was the requirement that there should have been a previous violation of 
practically any right of that state. Any violation, and the offended state was the only 
judge in its own case, gave rightful cause to use military force to restore justice and 
punish the offender. Ian Brownlie writes that: 
“The right of war, as an aspect of sovereignty, which existed in the period before 
1914, subject to the doctrine that war was a means of last resort in the enforcement 
of legal rights, was very rarely asserted either by statesmen or works of authority 
without some stereotyped plea to a right of self-preservation, and of self-defence, 
or to necessity or protection of vital interests, or merely alleged injury to rights or 
national honour and dignity”.7
For example, in 1914 during the Vera Cruz incident, triggered by the arrest by 
Mexican authorities of several crewmembers from the USS Dolphin, the United 
States used military force against Mexico when Mexican authorities refused to hon-
or the US À ag with a 21gun salute as an of¿ cial apology.8 Similarly, Great Britain 
and Germany used gunboats to force Venezuela to pay its debts to nationals of these 
states.9
 Although ideas about a world without wars have existed already for hun-
dreds of years10 the ¿ rst attempts at legal limitation of the use of force are no more 
than a century old. The 1907 Hague Peace Conference adopted the Convention Re-
4 Ibid.
5 A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society, Routledge, 1992, p. 10
6 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (revised edn.), Macmillan, 1964, p. 11.
7 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 41.
8 Ibid. pp. 55-65.
9 Ibid. p. 75.
10 See, e.g., Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe (1713); E. Kant, 
Toward Perpetual Peace (1795).
5International Law and use of force
specting the Limitation of Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts 
that provided that there should be no recourse to armed force, unless the debtor state 
should refuse submission to arbitration or should fail to carry out the award.11 The 
so-called Bryan Treaties that the United States concluded in 1913-1914 with vari-
ous states established a ‘cooling off’ period during which it was prohibited to use 
military force.12 The Covenant of the League of Nations purported to put some more 
brakes of the right of states to use military force.13 Finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
of 1928 outlawed ‘war as an instrument of national policy’.14 However, these were 
not so much shortcomings of these legal documents as political realities that led to 
the Second World War after which the members of the victorious coalition, creating 
the United Nations, whose main task should have been to put an end not only to wars 
but also to any unilateral use of force. 
 The current UN Charter paradigm concerning the use of force can be called 
normative positivism since it is based on the consent of states and not upon what 
states (or at least most of them) do in practice. It is normative since it is not premised 
on the actual practice of states. It is positivist since it does not make distinctions 
between just, unjust, more justi¿ ed, and less justi¿ ed causes for the use of force.
2. The UN Charter paradigm on use of force
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter reads: “All Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”. This means that not only is use of military force 
prohibited but so is the threat to use such force. The Charter makes only two express 
exceptions to this prohibition: to the use of military force in self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs (Article 51) and as a collective security measure authorised by the UN 
Security Council in cases of threats to international peace and security (Articles 39 
and 42). However, notwithstanding of its brevity, Article 2(4) has raised some heated 
discussions and doubts. First, as the article does not clarify what kind of force is 
prohibited, some authors and even states have tried to include economic and politi-
cal pressure in the de¿ nition of force prohibited by Article 2(4). However, it is clear 
from the travaux preparatoir of the UN Charter as well as from the interpretations 
given by the majority of states to the content of this article that its prohibition covers 
only military force. This, of course, does not mean that economic or political pres-
sure is always lawful under international law; this means only that Article 2(4) does 
not cover such pressure. Secondly, as Article 2(4) singles out for special protection 
above-mentioned three factors (territorial integrity, political independence of states, 
and otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations) some, especially 
American, authors have tried to argue that if use of force does not breach any of 
11 See, Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 217.
12 Brownlie, op.cit., p. 23.
13 Ibid. pp. 55-65.
14 Ibid. p. 75.
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them (e.g., use of force for the sake of protection of human rights or promotion of 
democracy) such use of force is lawful. We will discuss some of these controversial 
issue later in the this Chapter, but here it suf¿ ce to say that such arguments express 
a minority view and are not accepted by states.
 The prohibition of the use of force is one of the few imperative (jus cogens) 
norms of international law, from which states cannot derogate even with mutual 
consent. Although it may be surprising, it is nevertheless true that the prohibition of 
the use of force in international relations became a legally binding norm relatively 
recently. As a legal principle it started its evolution after World War I and matured 
as a result of World War II; it was enshrined in the United Nations Charter and its 
importance has not diminished since, notwithstanding its overly frequent breaches. 
As the International Court of Justice put it in the Nicaragua case: ‘If a State acts 
in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct 
by appealing to exceptions or justi¿ cations contained within the rule itself, then 
whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justi¿ able on that basis, the signi¿ cance 
of that attitude is to con¿ rm rather than to weaken the rule’.15 Although some in-
ternational lawyers have claimed that due to the inef¿ ciency of the UN collective 
security system the Charter prohibition of the use of force has become redundant,16 
no state has made such a claim. While justifying their own transgressions states 
are usually ‘appealing to exceptions or justi¿ cations within the rule’, and when 
condemning the use of force by others, they con¿ rm their own adherence to the 
principle.  
a) The right to self-defence
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security”.
The right to self-defence is the only right in the UN Charter that is called “inher-
ent”. One the one hand, such a reference to the inherent, inalienable, even natural 
character of this right shows its importance. Indeed, if states would not be lawfully 
able to protect themselves against armed attacks, their very right to existence would 
15 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) , ICJ Decision of 27 June 1986, para. 186.
16 See, e.g., T. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4) or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States’, The American Journal of International Law, 1970, Vol. 64; but see also L. Henkin, ‘The Re-
ports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated’, The American Journal of International 
Law, 1971, Vol. 65.
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be also questionable. One the other hand, this formula has led to some heated discus-
sions and opened doors to wide interpretations and even abuses.
First, Article 51 requests that states, which use military force in self-defence, 
report all the measures taken in the exercise of this right to the Security Council. The 
Council then decides what measures to take “in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security”. If the Council, say, authorises economic sanctions against 
an aggressor as measure necessary to restore peace and security, does this mean that 
the victim state and its allies are barred from using military force in self-defence? 
Such an ambiguous legal situation, existed, for example in the period between the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 and 29 November 1990, when the Secu-
rity Council adopted resolution 678 authorising the “use of all necessary means” (a 
euphemism implying the right to use military force) to liberate Kuwait and imple-
ment all the relevant Security Council resolutions. Could Kuwait and its allies start 
using military force in self-defence before the deadline (15 January 1991) given by 
the Council to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait? Such an ambiguous legal situation 
also led to the dispute over the character of Operation Desert Storm that led to the 
liberation of Kuwait. Was it an operation of collective self-defence or an operation of 
collective security? In our opinion it had characteristics of both of them.
Moreover, the Security Council may ¿ nd that a state that is allegedly using force 
in self-defence is wrong in its assessment of its actions, that instead of lawfully using 
force, it is in breach of the prohibition to use force. The possibility of facing such a 
situation means that states are not the ¿ nal arbiters on matters of lawfulness of use 
of force and therefore the right to self-defence may not be, after all, so inalienable. 
However, the term “inherent” in the context of self-defence has had more heated 
academic discussions and much more serious practical consequences in another re-
spect – in respect of so-called anticipatory self-defence that is sometimes also called 
pre-emptive or even preventive self-defence. In short, the problem is the following: 
is it necessary for a victim of an armed attack to wait until, ¿ guratively speaking, 
bombs and missiles already explode, or is it legally justi¿ able to take counter-meas-
ures, involving military force, at some earlier point, e.g., intercepting missiles or 
bombers before they reach their targets?
In the positivist era of international law, the right of anticipatory self-defence 
was grounded on the formula put forward by the American Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster in the Carolina incident of 1837. In that case, the British authorities located 
in Canada – at that time a British colony – destroyed the US steamboat Caroline 
anchored on the American side of the Niagara river, since The Caroline had been 
used to supply rebels against the British rule in Canada. The United States disagreed 
with the British government as to the legality of the action. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster wrote to Mr Fox, the British Minister to Washington, that it had to be dem-
onstrated that there was the necessity to use force in self-defence that was “instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” 
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and that the act “justi¿ ed by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that 
necessity, and kept clearly within it”.17 It seems to be possible to generalise all these 
criteria by the terms of necessity, immediacy and proportionality. Every use of force 
even in self-defence, in order to be lawful, has to be necessary (e.g., it is possible 
that a limited military incursion by the forces of state A into the territory of state B 
remained without adequate immediate response; in such a case state B is not entitled 
to respond ex post facto militarily against state A; this would breach both the require-
ments of necessity and immediacy), proportionate to the situation that calls for the 
use of force, and exercised within reasonable time period. 
Analysing self-defence, Yoram Dinstein distinguishes between ‘on the spot re-
action’, ‘defensive armed reprisals’, responses to an ‘accumulation of events’ and 
‘war of self-defence’ that are all different modalities of the use of force that can be 
resorted to depending on the character of the armed attack that has triggered the 
right to use force in self-defence.18  The legality of these modalities of self-defence 
is dependent on the character of an armed attack.  It seems natural that the modalities 
of the use of force for humanitarian purposes must also correspond to the objectives 
of the use of force. They have to be adequate and proportionate to these objectives.
Thus, whilst the Caroline incident evidences that the occurrence of an armed 
attack is not necessary to justify the exercise of self-defence, it quali¿ ed the right of 
pre-emptive action with several rather strict conditions in order to be legally accept-
ed. According to this formula, pre-emptive action is only lawful when the danger 
is imminent in a way that the defending state has had no time for deliberation or to 
choose an alternative course of action. This implies that the danger can be identi¿ ed 
credibly, speci¿ cally and with a high degree of certainty.19 
The Israeli use of force in the so-called 6-day war in 1967 against Egypt seems 
to be an example of an anticipatory use of force in self-defence in terms of the Caro-
line case, customary international law, and it is possible to argue, also of Article 51 
of the UN Charter since the Charter has to be interpreted in the context of existing 
customary international law. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers at the request 
of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, mobilisation and movements of Egyptian forces, 
and last but not least, the closer of the Straits of Tiran for Israeli navigation, seem to 
indicate, with high probability, that an attack on Israel would have been imminent. 
Israel, in the UN, referred to the closer of the Straits of Tiran, as an act of war, and 
therefore didn’t raise the defence of anticipatory self-defence. However, it seems 
that if Israel were relying only on this fact alone, its response may have breached 
the requirement of proportionality. Israeli response, surely, was much more mas-
sive than, say, on the spot reaction in the Straits of Tiran or another proportionate 
response. 
17 ‘The Caroline’, J, Moore, 2 Digest of International Law, p. 412 . See also, R.Y. Jennings, ‘The 
Caroline and McLeod Cases’. 32 American Journal of International Law (1938).
18 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence (2nd edition), Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 
213-245. 
19 T. Franck, “Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence”, note 69 supra, p 841
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Developments related to the “war on terror” have given support to two hitherto 
somewhat controversial interpretations of self-defence: it is now more widely ac-
cepted that there is a room for anticipatory self-defence as well as for what Oscar 
Schachter, Yoram Dinstein and some others have called defencive reprisals, i.e. re-
prisals whose main purpose is not to punish (so-called punitive reprisals are pro-
hibited by international law). Or rather, in responses to terrorist attacks these two 
wider interpretations of use of force go hand in hand. Effective responses to typical 
terrorist pin-prick attacks have to be either carried out ex post facto or in anticipation 
of a new probable attack from the same source.  Here, responses can be characterised 
both as defencive reprisals or acts of anticipatory self-defence. 
Often military responses to terrorist attacks have to draw a ¿ ne balance between 
two controversial modalities of the use of military force in self-defense—the Scylla 
of anticipatory self- defense and the Charybdis of reprisals. As Gregory Travalio 
writes, “if the anticipated action by terrorists is not suf¿ ciently imminent, the right 
to use force is not available for purposes of deterrence. On the other hand, if past ter-
rorist actions by a group are too remote in time, the response by force is likely to be 
characterized as an illegal reprisal.”20 Because terrorist warfare usually consists of a 
series of relatively small-scale attacks that often need to be prevented by measures 
that combine some elements of retaliation (since a response comes after the attack) 
and anticipation (since a response comes in anticipation of a new attack), the exer-
cise of the right to self-defense against terrorist attacks requires at least some (some-
times quite considerable) practical use of concepts of a anticipatory self-defense and 
defensive reprisals.
However, there is a different interpretation of the right to self-defence that is 
often called the “Bush doctrine” or “preventive self-defence”.  In response to its per-
ception of a fundamentally changed international situation, in 2002 the USA adopted 
a new National Security Strategy that stated: “While the US will constantly strive 
to enlist the support of international community, we will not hesitate to act alone if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such 
terrorists, to prevent them form doing harm against our people and our country.”21 
What the “Bush Doctrine” implies is that the traditional conditions of anticipatory 
self-defence and the requirement of clear demonstration of the threatening intentions 
of the adversary are no longer tenable, since an attack by weapons of mass destruc-
tion could be launched at any time, anywhere, without warning. Rather than wait for 
that to happen or waiting for the last moment that would reduce the chance of fore-
stalling such an attack, states have the right to use force preventively to eliminate 
such a threat in its early stage. Thus, the strategy would be better described as “pre-
20 G.M. Travalio, ‘Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force’, 18(1) Wisconsin In-
ternational Law Journal 165.
21 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.> [Hereinafter National Security Strategy]
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ventive” rather than “pre-emptive”, because the aim is to prevent materialization of 
generalized threats, rather than to avert an identi¿ ed, imminent threat.22
Michale Reisman has de¿ ned preventive self-defence as “a claim of authority to 
use, unilaterally and without international authorization, high levels of violence in 
order to arrest a development that is not yet operational and hence is not yet directly 
threatening, but which, if permitted to mature, could be neutralized only at a high, 
possibly unacceptable, cost. It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which PSD 
(preventive self-defence) might appear justi¿ ed. Yet if universalized, the claim, by 
increasing the expectation and likelihood of violence, could undermine minimum 
order’.23 German author Michael Bothe believes that to adapt the right to self-de-
fence to these new perceived threats is unacceptable and would lead to vagueness 
and increase the risk of abuse. He argues:
“If we want to maintain international law as a restraint on the use of military 
force, we should very carefully watch any attempt on the part of opinion leaders to 
argue that military force is anything other than an evil that has to be avoided. The 
lessons of history are telling. If we revert to such broad concepts, such as the just 
war concept, to justify military force we are stepping on a slippery slope, one which 
would make us slide back into the nineteenth century when war was not illegal”.24 
This seems to be a dominant position of international legal scholarship.
To clarify the differences between anticipatory self-defence, which under cer-
tain strict conditions is arguably lawful, and preventive self-defence, which is con-
trary to existing international law, it is possible to compare two uses of military 
force both involving Israel: the June 1967 6-day war (discussed shortly above) that 
many international lawyers have considered to be within the frame of legitimate self-
defence and the 7 June 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear centre in Iraq that in the 
eyes of most international lawyers, as well as of the UN Security Council, has been 
a case of breach of international law.  
The concept of self-defence is inherently linked to the concept of an armed at-
tack. The mere possession or attempts of acquisition of of nuclear weapons cannot 
be equated with an armed attack notwithstanding how wide an interpretation we give 
to the concept of “armed attack”. Proliferation of WMD and self-defence are phe-
nomena from different legal domains or branches of international law. Proliferation 
of nuclear weapons may be considered as a threat to international peace and security. 
When we talk about possible use of force against nuclear proliferation we are not in 
the domain of self defence; we are in the domain of arms control or in the domain of 
threats to international, including regional, peace and security and this is a matter for 
the UN Security Council to decide.
22  Sapiro, M. “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defence”, 97 AJIL, 2003, p 599; Falk, R. 
“What Future of the UN Charter System of War Prevention”, 97 AJIL, 2003, p 598
23  M. Reisman, Self-defense in an Age of Terrorism, ASIL Proceedings, 2003.
24  M. Bothe, Terrorism and the legality of pre-emptive force, (2003) EJIL 227.
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The necessity to use military force in self-defense against terrorist attacks shows 
that the dividing line drawn, for example, by the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua Case between armed attacks and “less grave forms” of the use of force,25 
is no longer tenable, if it ever was. Yoram Dinstein, referring to J.L. Hargrove and 
J.I. Kunz, has rightly emphasized that “in reality, there is no cause to remove small-
scale armed attacks from the spectrum of armed at- tacks. Article 51 in no way limits 
itself to large, direct or important armed attacks.”26 The same criticism also applies 
to Article 3(g) of the De¿ nition of Aggression, which emphasizes that actions by 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries “sent by or on behalf of a state,” 
which carry out acts of armed force against another state “of such gravity as to 
amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces” could be considered 
as acts of aggression.27 Why only attacks of such gravity? Why this difference? It is 
the requirement of proportionality between a legitimate purpose for the use of force 
and the character and scale of force necessary to achieve that purpose that has to take 
care that relatively minor incidents involving the use of military force do not escalate 
(sometimes unintentionally) into whole-scale wars.
 Finally, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that Article 51 speaks 
of both individual and collective self-defence. The right to collective self-defence, 
i.e. defencive use of military force by two or more states in the case if one of them 
is attacked, may be exercised in accordance with bilateral or multilateral treaties on 
collective self-defence but also without any previous agreements on the matter. 
3. Collective security and use of force.
Article 39 of the UN Charter provides: “The Security Council shall determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”. 
Further, Article 42 stipulates: “Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 (i.e., measures not involving use of military force) would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”.
 These articles of the UN Charter, and more widely Chapter 7 of the Charter 
as a whole, provide for the possibility of use of military force for the purposes of col-
lective security. Such uses of force have to be decided or authorised by the UN Se-
curity Council. For example, in its resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 the Security 
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits, I.C.J. Re-
ports 1986, para. 191.
26 Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 
p. 192.
27 See 1974 U.N. De¿ nition of Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 
(XXIX) (1975).
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Council authorised “Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, 
unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 
1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and 
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to re-
store international peace and security in the area”. It is important to note that here the 
Security Council did not decide or order to “use all necessary means” but authorised 
states individually and collectively to do that. The reason for such a nuance is that 
the initial idea of the drafters of the UN Charter of creating the UN armed forces, as 
provided in Article 43 of the Charter, was never realised in practice. Instead special 
operations, involving relatively lightly armed UN military personnel, were invented 
whose main task has been to help keep peace serving mostly as buffers between 
conÀ icting states or factions within the same states. These operations are called UN 
peace-keeping operations and forces participating in them are called peace-keepers. 
Later, some regional organisations, like the European Union, African Union and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have also resorted to peace-keeping 
operations. However, where there is no peace to keep but the situation constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security, the United Nations has to authorise states 
individually or collectively to use all necessary means, including military force, in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter foresees the creation of regional organiza-
tions of collective security and provides for the use of enforcement actions by such 
organizations. However, Article 53 stipulates that “no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization 
of the Security Council”. Notwithstanding this clause in the UN Charter, some re-
gional organizations have not only taken such actions without the Security Council’s 
authorization (e.g. the ECOWAS – the Economic Community of Western African 
States – at the beginning of the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone), but the ECO-
WAS and the African Union have changed their respective constitutive documents 
in order to provide for such enforcement actions without the Security Council’s au-
thorization.28
 African Union (AU) has formally claimed for itself the right to intervene in 
Member States in instances of gross human rights violations. In accordance with 
Art. 4 (h) Constitutive Act of the African Union, the organization may intervene 
in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity. In accordance with Art. 7 (1) Constitutive Act of the Af-
rican Union, the Assembly may take such a decision on the basis of a 2/3 majority. 
Apart from arguing that the AU would be claiming a ‘right of emergency’ for itself, 
it is also arguable that Art. 4 (h) constitutes a collective, ex ante form of intervention 
28 See, e.g., A Abass ‘The Security Council and the Challenges of Collective Security in the Twenty-
First Century: What Role for African Regional Organisations?’ in D Lewis (ed) Global Govern-
ance and the Quest for Justice vol 1 International and Regional Organisations (Hart Oxford 2006) 
91–112.
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by invitation. Since the Member States of the AU have given their express consent 
to military intervention under certain conditions, the use of force would fall outside 
the scope of the prohibition in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and not be in violation of the 
UN Charter. However, this argument in turn raises the question whether such an 
invitation can be extended for an open-ended period of time, or whether it has to be 
limited to a particular conÀ ict.29  
4. Use of force for humanitarian purposes. 
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the bi-polar world with its discipline and rela-
tive stability, there was an increase of internal conÀ icts in the different parts of the 
world. Somalia and Rwanda in Africa, Haiti on the Western Hemisphere, the former 
Yugoslavia in the Balkans have been the most prominent examples. Such conÀ icts 
involved massive human rights violations (even acts of genocide) that often esca-
lated into prolonged humanitarian crises. Some of these crises indeed constituted 
threats to regional peace and security. Therefore the UN Security Council started 
adopting so-called Chapter VII resolutions (on Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugosla-
via etc.) whereby the Council, having found that certain situations involving mas-
sive human rights violations, constituted threats to international peace and security, 
decided to send peace-keepers whose mandate among other tasks (maintaining or 
restoring peace, helping ¿ nd political solutions to the conÀ ict etc.) included humani-
tarian component. As such operations were authorised by the UN Security Council, 
there have not been serious doubts about their legality or legitimacy, though such 
practice rather creatively enlarged the competences of the Security Council, extend-
ing it to humanitarian crises that traditionally had been beyond the mandate of the 
Security Council.
However, there is a much more controversial question of unilateral, i.e. not au-
thorised by the UN Security Council, use of military force for humanitarian purposes 
or as it is usually called “humanitarian intervention”. Historically, eminent authors 
such as Hugo Grotius and Emerich Vattel had supported the idea that in certain ex-
treme circumstances states could lawfully use military force to protect nationals of 
other states from their own governments (however, one should not forget that at that 
time use of military force was not prohibited and was even considered as an attribute 
of state sovereignty). However, when the frames of lawful use of military force be-
came increasingly restricted and especially after the adoption of the UN Charter with 
its Article 2(4) prohibiting the use and threat of force, it became also more and more 
dif¿ cult to justify use of military force for humanitarian purposes.   
Today, in most circumstances, the use of military force for humanitarian pur-
poses is not only counterproductive, but in the absence of the Security Council’s 
authorisation it is also unlawful. As a general proposition, such a conclusion corre-
sponds to political realities, existing legal norms, and maybe most importantly, it is 
29 E. De Witt, M. Wood, Collective Security,  Max Planck  Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(http://www.mpepil.com/).
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even morally sound notwithstanding a noble aim in the use of force – the protection 
of human rights in cases of their massive violation. The important point to be made 
is that any use of military force, even one genuinely carried out for the sake of sav-
ing human lives, contains in itself a signi¿ cant potential for even greater loss of life, 
the inÀ iction of grievous bodily harm on a massive scale, the loss of property and 
the infringement of other values, which are protected as fundamental human rights.
Of course, the same may be said about the use of force in exercising one’s inher-
ent right to self-defence “if an armed attack occurs”, as con¿ rmed in Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. However, wars of self-defence (though this right is often abused) 
are by their very nature wars of necessity - they are never wars of choice if we dis-
count surrendering as an acceptable moral choice (it may also be a choice but then 
there is no use of force). Yet, the use of force by state A with humanitarian purposes 
against state B, in a case where B does not threaten A’s security, can never be a war 
of necessity in the same sense (both in a physical and moral sense) as wars of self-
defence are (though a humanitarian crisis in neighbouring country C may constitute 
a security threat for A due, for instance, to refugee À ows, but this is a different issue 
to be addressed separately). However, one may ask: can there not be any circum-
stances in which the use of force by state A in the territory of and against state B, in 
case of a severe humanitarian crisis in the latter, even if the crisis does not constitute 
a security threat to A, may be considered a “war of necessity”, if not in the physical 
sense (in that respect there is always a choice: intervene militarily or not) as wars 
of self-defence are, but in a moral sense, which wars of self-defence also are? We 
believe that in certain circumstances it would be possible to give a positive answer 
to this question. In situations where the use of military force is the only means of 
preventing or stopping massive human rights violations such as genocide or crimes 
against humanity, the absolute prohibition to use force would deprive these prohibi-
tions of their enforceability even in principle, and in such a case these prohibitions 
cannot be considered as valid human rights norms. Therefore the use of military 
force in certain extreme circumstances may have the characteristics of a ‘war of ne-
cessity’ – a war of moral necessity. For example, both the world community of states 
and individual states that had the necessary capacities, ¿ rst to prevent and then stop 
genocide in Rwanda (this would have clearly been a lesser evil than allowing the 
foreseeable and preventable genocide to happen and once started to stop it), failed in 
their duty both collectively and individually. Their’s was a moral surrender similar 
to the behaviour of those nations, which surrender without a ¿ ght, or attempt to ¿ ght, 
when attacked by an enemy, resisting whom is not foreseeably a lost cause. 
Moral justi¿ cation for the use of military force for the sake of the protection of 
human rights in a foreign country can be best based on ideas developed by British 
political and legal philosopher Lord Raymond Plant. As human rights are real only 
in the case of their enforceability (at least in principle though not always in practice, 
but this is another, though no more less important, matter which belongs more to the 
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realm of practical politics and law than moral philosophy), their unenforceability, 
even in principle, deprives them of their quality as human rights. Lord Plant writes:
‘Our responsibility for the rights of others is therefore not con¿ ned to non-inter-
ference in those rights, but also has to involve responsibility for doing what we can 
to secure those enforceability conditions, just because these are part of having a right 
and therefore must be involved in what respecting rights means. This seems to me 
to be the best way of linking a concern for rights and the possibility of intervention 
in a particular country, which may not be securing the enforcement conditions’.30
If there are circumstances when the use of military force is the only means 
of protecting rights, and the resort to such an extreme measure, which in itself is 
wrought with the danger of massive violations of most fundamental human rights, 
is proportionate to the seriousness of the human rights violations (genocide, crimes 
against humanity and systemic massive violations of international humanitarian 
law), then the use of military force may be morally justi¿ ed as a necessary condition 
of these rights being rights. The most important general guiding principle in such 
a situation should be that extreme human suffering, which one attempts to stop or 
prevent, has to be signi¿ cantly and foreseeably higher than the human suffering that 
inevitably results from the use of force to end the suffering. And always, the objec-
tive should be to stop or prevent extreme human suffering and not to effect regime 
change, though this might occur as an inevitable or even necessary corollary of the 
intervention.
From these arguments of moral philosophy it is possible to move to the legal jus-
ti¿ cation of the use of military force for the sake of the protection of human rights. 
The UN Security Council’s authorization would make interventions on humani-
tarian grounds both lawful under international law and legitimate in the eyes of 
most people, and though even they may, in principle, do more harm than good, in 
such cases there is less chance that hasty decisions, dictated by narrow self-interest 
and facilitated by an ignorance of the risks that any military operation involves, 
are made. However, in extreme circumstances, we believe, there may not only be a 
moral-philosophical, but also a legal justi¿ cation for intervention on humanitarian 
grounds, even without the Security Council’s authorisation. It is necessary to empha-
sise, ¿ rst, the importance of the words ‘in extreme circumstances’ since any use of 
military force, as we have just discussed, inevitably leads to a serious loss of life, i.e. 
it always creates circumstances conducive to massive violations of the right to life – 
the most basic human right without which the enjoyment of all other rights becomes 
meaningless and impossible. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances when the 
use of military force may be justi¿ ed not only on moral but also on legal grounds. 
30  R. Plant, ‘Rights, Rules and World Order’ in Global Governance: Ethics and Economics of the 
World Order (M. Desai, P. Redfern eds.), Pinter, 1995, p. 207.
16
International Law and use of force
First, let us deal with a preliminary point. It is often said that if there were a right 
to use military force for the sake of human rights, states would constantly abuse it. 
It may well be the case, and in some military interventions allegedly carried out for 
humanitarian purposes, such justi¿ cations have been used to conceal other aims. 
However, so far states have more often referred to the right to self-defence when 
using force aggressively, i.e. they abuse this inherent right. Moreover, the fact that 
the use of military force with the purported aim of protecting human rights in cases 
of their gross and massive violation is often abused, should not in itself serve as an 
absolute obstacle on the road to human rights protection even by means of force, if 
other means have proven to be, or would clearly be, inadequate, and it is also one 
of those rare situations when the use of force foreseeably does less harm than the 
abstention from the use of force. Almost every right, almost every good may be open 
to abuse. As the former President of the International Court of Justice Dame Rosalyn 
Higgins has written, ‘we must face the reality that we live in a decentralised inter-
national legal order, where claims may be made either in good faith or abusively’.31 
The fact that claims over some goods or rights are made abusively should not mean 
that these goods or rights thereby become less valuable. 
Now, there comes the main, in our opinion, argument in favour of both the legal-
ity and legitimacy of the use of force for humanitarian purposes. There is no doubt, 
as we have discussed above, that the principle of the prohibition of the use of force is 
one of the fundamental principles of international law. The United Nations Interna-
tional Law Commission, in its various reports dealing with the issue of peremptory 
norms in international law (jus cogens norms), from which states cannot deviate or 
derogate even with the consent of other states, has always given as an example of 
such norms the norm prohibiting the use of military force.32 As we saw above, this 
norm has not lost its fundamental importance notwithstanding its all too frequent 
violation. On the contrary, its signi¿ cance is only enhanced by such breaches; the 
reason being is that if a norm protects something that people continue to value highly 
(peace in this case) then violations of such a norm indicate that it is necessary to 
strengthen the norm instead of discarding it. In legal terms, we may say that in such 
cases strong opinio juris compensates for a less than perfect observance of the norm 
in practice. However, the prohibition of the use of force is not the only fundamental 
principle of international law. The principle of respect for and protection of human 
rights has acquired the same status. In its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
the International Law Commission emphasises not only the importance of the non-
use of force principle as a peremptory norm of international law but also the same 
character of certain human rights norms, such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery 
and torture.33
31  R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, 1944, 
p. 247.
32  See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with com-
mentaries, 2001, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 112.
33  Ibid., pp.112-113.
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In cases of gross and massive violation of such fundamental human right as the 
right to life, which are always accompanied by egregious violations of many other 
rights, the prohibition of the use of military force may yield to the obligation to 
respect and protect human rights. In such cases we have two equally important and 
weighty principles of international law that cannot be observed at the same time and 
in the same context; one has to give way. Such potential for collision is enshrined in 
the very nature of the principles of international law. As one of the greatest twentieth 
century international lawyers, Oscar Schachter, wrote, ‘principles, in contrast [to 
rules], lack the element of de¿ niteness, they are “open-textured”, leaving room for 
various interpretations’.34 And he emphasises that ‘particular situations are covered 
by more than one principle. … They point to different legal conclusions. Indeed, it 
has often been observed that principles like proverbs can be paired off into oppo-
sites’.35 In particular situations the prohibition to commit acts of genocide or crimes 
against humanity, and even more importantly, the obligation to prevent such acts 
being committed,36 may outweigh the prohibition to use military force. In such ex-
treme situations the use of force for humanitarian purposes, even without the Secu-
rity Council’s authorisation, may be both legitimate and lawful. 
There have been three signi¿ cant, relatively large-scale and successful foreign 
invasions that have put an end to massive human rights violations which may be 
characterised either as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, though 
quite interestingly and even understandably, none of the invading states referred to 
humanitarian concerns as the only or main reason or justi¿ cation for their actions. 
The overthrow of the regimes of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, the ousting of Pol Pot 
in the same year in the so-called Democratic Kampuchea, and the Indian 1971-72 
intervention in Eastern Pakistan, which all put an end to massive crimes against the 
civilian populations, all also ended up with a change of the regimes that had com-
mitted those atrocities (in the case of the Indian intervention it led to the breakup of 
Pakistan and the creation of a new state in Eastern Pakistan - Bangladesh). None of 
these interventions was sanctioned by the United Nations and the intervening states 
preferred to refer to self-defence as the justi¿ cation instead of ‘purely humanitarian 
34 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course in Public International 
Law,  Recueille des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International, 1982, vol. V, p. 43.
35 Ibid.
36 Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides 
that ‘The Contracting Parties con¿ rm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time 
of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish’. (http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm). As we emphasised above and it is not superÀ uous to 
reiterate this here, crimes against humanity and systemic war crimes are often not less grave than 
acts of genocide. Crimes against humanity are, by de¿ nition, ‘widespread and systematic’, while 
war crimes, if not individual excesses, but state policy (or policy of other organised groups), are 
always massive and heinous.  
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concerns’.37 Naturally, in all these cases, besides the humanitarian issues, there were 
other concerns and interests present, if not dominant, though none of these military 
operations could be quali¿ ed as actions of self-defence. There is something signi¿ -
cant in the fact that these three large-scale, successful foreign military interventions, 
which were responses to genuine humanitarian catastrophes (even if not justi¿ ed 
by references to them) and put an end to those catastrophes, were carried out by 
non-Western nations. One of the reasons for their success in the sense of the sustain-
ability of the main results of their interventions (the end of mass atrocities and not 
democracy building) may have been in that after overthrowing bloody dictators (Idi 
Amin and Pol Pot) and putting an end to Islamabad’s repressions in Eastern Paki-
stan, the intervening states did not attempt to put in place pro-Western or Western-
sounding and Western-looking governments, and did not carry out nation building 
exercises with the aim of “widening the circle of liberal democracies” in the world. 
Some concluding remarks
In a textbook on international law, it is not possible to cover all the aspects of 
this important branch of international law. There are some problems such as use 
of military forces at the invitation of a foreign government on the territory of that 
foreign state, which may under certain conditions be lawful; intervention in internal 
conÀ icts (civil wars) in foreign countries that in the absence of a Security Council 
authorization is unlawful and some other uses of force not covered in this Chapter. 
Some of the newest problems are the issue of cyber-attacks and possible counter-
measures to them, use of force in outer space, and use of drones (unmanned areal 
vehicles) in armed conÀ icts.
Although armed conÀ icts that are taking place today in different parts of the 
world (mostly internal by origin but often involving also foreign states) are due not 
to the de¿ ciencies of the legal regulation of use of force, but to political, economic 
and military-strategic interests of states, numerous grey zones and indeterminacies 
in this domain of international law are due to the desire of most powerful states to 
leave their hands free to further their vital interests, using all, including military, 
means.
37  In December 1971, immediately after the Indian intervention had started, the Indian Ambassador 
to the UN declared: ‘[W]e have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of 
intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering’ (UN Doc. S/PV.1606, 
4 December 1971, p. 86). Soon, however, the Indian Government denounced this statement of its 
Ambassador and referred to the right of self-defence instead.
